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Jeff Schwartz*
The concentration of public equity in the hands of just a few mutual-fund complexes has
raised concerns about whether these institutions take seriously the stewardship obligations that
come with the significant voting power that they have amassed. One leading theory, the agencycost theory, is that the major fund complexes, all of which specialize in passively managed funds,
lack the incentive to adequately police corporate managers on behalf of fund shareholders.
Others counter that competition for mutual-fund investors provides sufficient incentive for
satisfactory oversight.
I argue that neither agency costs nor competitive incentives are the primary driver of
stewardship behavior. Rather, the large mutual-fund complexes act out of fear of public
retribution. They recognize that failure to look like good stewards could lead to potentially
costly regulations. This ‘publicness’ view stems from work that explains important aspects of
securities regulation as a response to the public’s desire to impose accountability and
transparency mechanisms usually associated with public bodies on powerful private institutions.
This lens suggests that large mutual-fund complexes act as stewards to avoid the consequences
of publicness, but does not suggest a need for reform.
Keywords: mutual funds, stewardship, publicness, agency costs, index funds, Vanguard,
BlackRock, State Street

“We are not a public company, but we must continuously earn and maintain the public trust.”
—Vanguard1

The rise of mutual funds has been a defining trend in finance. Unlike many financial
innovations, they have greatly improved the financial well-being of retail investors, many of
whom invest in mutual funds to save for retirement.2 Over the last 40 years, the bulk of retail
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investors have shifted from owning stocks directly in companies to holding them through these
financial intermediaries.3 This is a foremost example of economic theory impacting behavior
and bettering peoples’ lives. Finance theory teaches the value of a diversified portfolio. Mutual
funds offer diversification otherwise unobtainable to typical investors. Finance theory also
teaches that investors, on average, cannot earn returns in excess of the market.4 Through
passively managed funds (i.e., index funds), investors can own a portfolio that simply tracks an
index of securities. This frees them from fruitless stock-picking and unnecessary fees finance
professionals charge for it.5
Though a boon to investors, the tidal success of mutual funds has also brought
challenges. Professional stock pickers add value to markets because their buying and selling
activities bring stocks closer to fundamental value.6 Some worry that the widespread shift to
index funds means that there are too few monitoring what stocks are actually worth, meaning
that today’s prices may be far off.7
The popularity of mutual funds has also brought concentrated ownership. When
investors hold shares in companies through mutual funds, the funds are technically the

3
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institutions own about 80% of the stock market. See Charles McGrath, Pension & Investments, 80% of Equity
Market Cap Held by Institutions (Apr. 25, 2017),
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William F. Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 7 (quoted in
Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 550 (2009)).
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(2015) (discussing conflicting evidence and finding that active management adds value).
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Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 183 (2010).
7
See generally STEVEN D. BLEIBERG ET AL., EPOCH INV. PARTNERS, THE IMPACT OF PASSIVE INVESTING ON
MARKET EFFICIENCY (2017). In this volume, Professor Krug also argues that passive management compromises
investor protection. See generally Anita Krug, The Overlooked Effects of Passive Management, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION, (Arthur Laby ed., forthcoming 2020).
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shareholders of the company. Voting rights formerly dispersed among countless individual
investors have become concentrated in mutual funds. Beyond that, a few mutual-fund
complexes dominate the industry. Considered together, the so-called “Big 3”—Vanguard, State
Street, and Blackrock—are the largest shareholder in nearly ninety percent of S&P 500 firms.8
The implications of this fundamental shift in corporate control are something that
scholars are just beginning to grapple with.9 One key concern involves how it impacts
competition among portfolio firms.10 Controversial empirical work suggests that concentrated
equity ownership has anticompetitive effects.11
A related concern—and the focus here—is corporate stewardship. The shift in voting
power from individual owners to the Big 3, among other major fund complexes, begs the
question whether these institutions take their corporate governance rights seriously. Two
competing models of mutual-fund voting have recently emerged that seek to answer this
question; I introduce a third.
Professors Lucien Bebchuk and Scott Hirst argue that mutual funds, the Big 3 in
particular, serve as poor stewards because they lack the incentive to expend the necessary
resources.12 In what they refer to as an “agency cost” model, the authors contend that these
mutual-fund complexes do not fully internalize the benefits of good corporate governance at the

8

See Jan Fichtner et al., These Three Firms Own Corporate America, The CONVERSATION (May 10, 2017),
http://theconversation.com/these-three-firms-own-corporate-america-77072.
9
See, e.g., John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and
Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1261 (2014); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013); see
generally John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harvard Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 19-07 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp- content/uploads/2019/11/John-Coates.pdf.
10
See generally Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016).
11
See Einer Elhauge, How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy—and Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It, 10
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 207, 218-54 (2020) (reviewing empirical literature).
12
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2052.
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firms that they own and therefore underinvest.13 This results in lack of adequate oversight of
portfolio firms.14 The authors argue for a number of reforms to address this.15 Professors Jill
Fisch, Asaf Hammadi, and Steven Davidoff Solomon (“FHDS”) see the opposite.16 They argue
that the major mutual-fund complexes have ample competitive incentive to invest in corporate
governance, and that no regulatory changes are necessary.17 I refer to this as the “competitive
incentive” model.
I argue that both views, while important and illuminating, fail to capture the fundamental
driver of voting behavior at large mutual-fund complexes. The value proposition of stewardship
for mutual funds and their shareholders is uncertain.18 But mutual funds, especially the Big 3
fund complexes, are keenly aware that the public is watching them. This drives them to
participate in corporate governance just enough to ward off public opprobrium and potential
regulation. This explanation for their voting behavior can be characterized as a “publicness”
model. It builds on the publicness view of securities regulation, which starts from the insight
that even though public companies are nongovernmental entities, they have comparable power.19
The public thus demands transparency and accountability from these entities akin to truly public
institutions.20 Companies seek to ward off regulation by quelling such fears.21 I extend this

13

Id.
Id. at 2084 (“the total benefit produced by [Big 3] stewardship is less than would be desirable for their beneficial
investors.”)
15
Id. at 2116-17.
16
See generally Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street, A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168
PENN. L. REV. 17 (2019).
17
Id. at 26-27.
18
See infra Part II.D.
19
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2009); see generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, ‘Publicness’ in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New
“Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 138 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO.
W. L. REV. 1012 (2013).
20
See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 1066.
21
This implication of publicness has not yet been fully explored, though Professor Sale lays the groundwork:
“Corporate actors who want to maintain a zone of self-regulation must act with an understanding of the nature of
14
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concept to large mutual-fund complexes. Their reluctance to engage in stewardship until pushed
by regulators and public pressure, combined with their approach to stewardship, in which they
expend few resources and favor the same things regulators do, suggests they are driven more by
publicness concerns than agency costs or competition.
The publicness lens is descriptive, rather than normative. It is too abstract to provide a
roadmap for reform. Nevertheless, analyzing the Big 3’s actions in terms of publicness suggests
that immediate regulatory changes are unnecessary. Although the Big 3 may not be engaging in
stewardship for the ideal reasons, their actions seem to largely align with the best interests of the
mutual-fund shareholders whom they are supposed to represent.
In Part I, I describe the unique and counterintuitive structure of the mutual-fund industry
and how this structure fits in with public-company governance. Part II describes and critiques
both the agency-cost and the competitive-incentive models. Finally, Part III introduces the
publicness model and explores its implications.

I. Mutual Funds and Public-Company Governance
A. The Mutual Fund Industry
Mutual funds are pooled investment vehicles.22 Investors purchase shares in a fund,
which is frequently organized as a corporation. The fund then invests shareholder money in
securities, typically stocks or bonds. The fund owns the securities. The fund investors own
shares in the fund, which entitles them to an indirect pro-rata claim to the underlying fund

corporate publicness. The failure to do so will result in further pressure for more public governance…” Sale, Public
Governance, supra note 19, at 1033.
22
For an overview of mutual-fund structure, see Jeff Schwartz, Mutual Fund Conflicts of Interest in the Wake of the
Short-term Trading Scandals: Structural Change Through Shareholder Choice, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 91, 93-98
(2005).
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holdings. Mutual funds themselves do not have officers or employees or any assets aside from
the portfolio. Rather, the fund is managed by its sponsor, which is typically an independently
owned entity.23 Some, including Blackrock and State Street, are even public companies. A fund
sponsor may manage hundreds of individual mutual funds.
The U.S. mutual-fund industry is huge. At the end of 2019, there were about 21,000
mutual funds24 managed by 826 sponsors.25 The industry as a whole owns 32% of public
equity.26 It has about $25.7 trillion in assets under management.27
A key distinction in the industry, which is particularly relevant to mutual-fund voting, is
whether a fund is actively or passively managed. In an actively managed equity fund, the
sponsor attempts to beat the market by picking good stocks, buying low, and selling high. A
passively managed fund invests in an index of securities, like the S&P 500, without any attempt
at stock picking or market timing. Passively managed funds have grown tremendously in recent
years. In 2009, they held about $1.5 trillion in assets; 10 years later they held about $8.4
trillion.28 Over that time period, they went from 18% of total U.S. fund holdings to 38%.29
The Big 3 sponsors advise primarily passive funds, although each has significant active
holdings. About two-thirds of BlackRock’s holdings are passive; 75% of Vanguard’s; and 80%
of State Street’s.30

23

Vanguard is an important exception. Its firms are generally “internally managed,” meaning that the mutual fund
employs its managers. There is no Vanguard sponsor with its own shareholders; instead each mutual-fund investor
owns a Vanguard mutual fund. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 133-35.
24
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 31 fig. 2.2.
25
Id. at 44.
26
Id. at i.
27
Id.
28
See id. at 39 fig. 2.8.
29
Id.
30
HORTENSE BIOY ET AL., PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 4
(2017), https://www-prd.morningstar.com/content/dam/ marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-PassiveActive-Stewardship.pdf
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Because index funds have low overhead, they charge lower fees than actively managed
funds, sometimes even zero.31 This makes them an attractive proposition, especially given longstanding doubts about whether active management justifies the costs.32
The Big 3’s formidable holdings have given them enormous voting power. As noted
earlier, they are collectively the largest shareholder in about 90% of the largest companies. And
this understates their influence. Individual investors vote less than 1/3rd of their shares while
institutions vote almost all of them.33 As a result, mutual funds, the Big 3 in particular, are the
dominant players in corporate governance.

B. Public Company Corporate Governance
The rise of mutual funds has upended the traditional view of corporate governance and its
shortcomings. Corporate governance consists of three layers. Officers run the day-to-day affairs
of corporations. Boards of directors select the officers, decide their compensation, and oversee
them. Shareholders elect the members of the board. They also have the right to vote on
fundamental matters, like change-of-control transactions,34 and the right to make and vote on
nonbinding shareholder proposals. The recently enacted “say-on-pay” rules provide that public
company shareholders have the additional right to vote on executive compensation, although the
vote is nonbinding and occurs after the compensation award has already been determined.35

31

See Jeff Sommer, A Price War Has Driven Fund Fees to Zero. They May Be Set to Drop Further., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/business/price-war-fund-fees-zero-negative.html.
32
See discussion supra note 5.
33
See PROXY PULSE, 2019 PROXY SEASON REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridgeproxypulse-2019-review.pdf; See, e.g., Bioy et al., supra note 30, at 11.
34
Del. Gen. Corp. L. 242, 251 (2020).
35
17 CFR § 240.14a-21 (2020).
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The conventional law-and-economics conception of corporate governance views this
setup as a mechanism to police managerial agency costs.36 Shareholders are conceptualized as
the owners of the corporation and executive officers as their agents, duty-bound to maximize
profits on the shareholders’ behalf. Like all agents, however, officers have an incentive to shirk
their responsibilities and engage in self-dealing. The board’s role is to police the executives for
such behaviors on behalf of the shareholders.
Scholars viewed this arrangement as unsatisfactory for almost 100 years, but changes to
regulations and corporate practices, as well as the rise of mutual funds have made the critique far
less powerful. The Berle-Means thesis, as this longstanding critique is known, maintains that
dispersed public ownership renders corporate management unaccountable.37 In its modern form,
the theory is that the board of directors insufficiently police shareholder interests. Uninformed
public-company shareholders with small holdings lack both the expertise and incentive to ensure
that the board is actually monitoring management. Without shareholder oversight, boards
relinquish their supervisory role and executives runs amuck. Management compensation and
perquisites skyrocket while shareholder returns languish.
Under this lasting view of corporate governance, the principal challenge was to align
management incentives with shareholders and bolster board oversight. Over the last thirty years,
reformers have made major inroads with respect to both goals. Concern about management
agency costs fueled a migration to stock-based executive compensation. The trend began in the
1980s and now equity awards make up the bulk of executive pay.38 Fear of ineffectual boards

36

D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1996).
37
For See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
38
See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1917-18 (2013).
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also led to independence requirements. The NYSE and Nasdaq now require that listed firm
boards are majority independent.39 With management compensation now tied to stock
performance and their work subject to review by independent directors, concerns about
management effort and devotion are less salient.
And now the key factual underpinning of Berle-Means is dubious. The thesis assumes
that retail investors are widely dispersed and unsophisticated. This is why they cannot properly
oversee corporate boards and managers. The rise of mutual funds means that this is no longer
true. A handful of sophisticated institutions now hold what amount to controlling voting
blocks.40 They are much better positioned to oversee boards. If mutual funds are reliable
corporate-governance stewards, then the era of Berle-Means has come to an end.
It is often said that it takes a theory to beat a theory. A theory of mutual-fund voting is a
key underpinning for a new theory of corporate governance. This is where the agency-cost
model and the competitive-incentive model fit in—as competing theories about the nature of
mutual-fund stewardship.

II. Competing Theories of Mutual-Fund Stewardship
A. The Agency-Cost Model
Bebchuk and Hirst argue that agency costs are the “first-order driver of stewardship
decisions” at the Big 3.41 Agency costs at these fund complexes create an incentive for them to
underinvest in stewardship and excessively defer to corporate management.

39

See NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ STOCK MARKET LLC RULES 5605 (2020),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/Main/; NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01,
https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual.
40
See Coates, supra note 9, at 13-14 (“’The Big 3’ … controlled approximately 15% of the S&P 500 in 2017 -- a
much greater share of US public companies than any three single investors have ever previously done.”).
41
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2042.
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According to Bebchuk and Hirst, the agency costs primarily stem from positive
externalities. A fundamental economic principle is that activities that generate benefits for third
parties will be underprovided. Agitating for performance-improving change at public companies
has always been seen as one such activity. It is expensive and risky to challenge incumbent
management and gains are shared with all shareholders. The so-called “Wall Street Rule” says it
makes more sense to sell than to steer a poorly performing firm toward a more promising
future.42
Bebchuk and Hirst extend this line of thought to the fund context. Individual funds bear
the full costs of stewardship investments, but gains are shared with other funds. The incentive is,
therefore, to underinvest.43 Their focus is passively managed funds. Take an S&P 500 index
fund. Because these funds hold the same companies in the same proportion, gains in
performance brought about through stewardship investments by one S&P 500 index fund are
shared identically with all other such funds. That being the case, there is no competitive
advantage gained through stewardship.44 The authors argue in other work that the problem is
similar for actively managed funds.45 Any gains from stewardship are shared with all other
active managers that hold the same investment.46
The Bebchuk-Hirst critique also highlights positive externalities within the fund. They
argue that fund sponsors fail to internalize all of the gains from stewardship that accrue to its
own funds. Fund shareholders gain pro rata from the increase in the value of portfolio
companies that stem from performance-enhancing interventions. But the sponsors charge a fee

42

Id. at 2052.
Id. at 2052.
44
Id. at 2056-57.
45
Id. at 2118; See also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 95-104 (2017).
46
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2059.
43
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based on the percentage of assets under management. Thus, they only get a small compensation
uptick based on any increased fund value from stewardship.47 Since they do not internalize all of
the gains from active oversight, they have an incentive to underinvest in it.
Bebchuk and Hirst also argue that the incentive to be passive is combined with an
incentive to be deferential to management. Sponsors compete to administer the 401(k) plans of
the very same public companies in which their funds invest. 401(k) plans give employees the
opportunity to set aside a portion of their salaries in mutual funds on a tax-favored basis.48 If a
sponsor wins a company’s 401(k) business, then company employees will be channeled toward
the sponsor’s funds. This means fees for the sponsor from both administration and fund
management.49 It, therefore, cannot be good for business for sponsors to challenge the managers
of portfolio companies. These same managers choose, or have power over those who choose,
what sponsor oversees their company’s 401(k) plan. According to Bebchuk at Hirst, while fund
shareholders want sponsors to actively oversee companies in their funds, the sponsors
themselves have the incentive to treat them with kid gloves.50 Because all public companies are
potential clients, the incentive to defer even exists for companies where the fund has no
investments.51
A further disincentive, according to Bebchuk and Hirst, is that active involvement might
lead to a political backlash. If sponsors challenge powerful executives at public companies, they
might lobby politicians to enact costly mutual-fund regulations.52

47

Id. at 2054-55.
For a critique of 401(k) plans, see generally Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. LEG. 53 (2012). For a
critique in this volume, see generally Natalya Shnitser, Retirement Plan Reforms in the Absence of a Retirement
Policy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF INVESTOR PROTECTION, (Arthur Laby ed., forthcoming 2020).
49
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: CHANGES NEEDED TO PROVIDE 401(K) PLAN
PARTICIPANTS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BETTER INFORMATION ON FEES, GAO-O7-21, 3 (2006).
50
Id. at 2062-2063.
51
Id. at 2064.
52
Id. at 2069.
48
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Finally, there is a regulatory hurdle if sponsors want to actively push for change at public
companies where they hold greater than 5% of its shares. They must file a Schedule 13D. This
would generate significant paperwork.53
Bebchuk and Hirst argue that empirical evidence, much of it their own, supports their
critique. They show that the Big 3 have small stewardship teams54 and engage in few private
engagements with portfolio companies,55 particularly in comparison to their vast holdings. They
also show that the Big 3 vote based on certain governance principles rather than on
performance,56 and that they rarely oppose management compensation in say-on-pay votes (and
oppose far less than actively managed funds).57 Bebchuk and Hirst additionally fault index funds
for not being proactive. Such funds do not generally (i) intervene to address firm
underperformance,58 (ii) nominate directors,59 (iii) submit shareholder proposals,60 (iv) comment
on SEC proposals,61 (v) submit amicus briefs on relevant cases,62 or (vi) serve as lead plaintiffs
in class actions.63
Their claim that the Big 3 make for poor stewards leads them to a number of reform
proposals. Most aggressively, they recommend imposing mandatory stewardship expenditures64

53

Id. at 2065-66.
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2039, 2077.
55
Id. at 2086-88.
56
Id. at 2089-90.
57
Id. at 2092-94.
58
Id. at 2095.
59
Id. at 2098.
60
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2102.
61
Id. at 2107
62
Id. at 2110
63
Id. at 2112.
64
Id. at 2121.
54
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and size caps on fund complexes,65 and prohibiting 401(k) advising by mutual funds (or at least
more disclosure related thereto).66

B. Critique of the Agency-Cost Model
The thrust of Bebchuk’s and Hirst’s argument is that index funds, and the sponsors that
oversee them, should be more activist—that they should intervene in portfolio-company affairs
with demands that would improve firm performance—and that agency costs are what hold them
back. While they are right that index funds are not activists, it is unlikely that agency costs are
the key driver.
Intervention is Costly and Uncertain. In most cases, insiders know best how to maximize
the value of the firm’s they run. They are intimately aware of the details of its operations.
Shareholders are outsiders with a significant informational and expertise disadvantage.
Shareholders are not dissimilar to regulators, who are often criticized for imposing rules without
detailed knowledge of company operations.
Just like regulators, however, there are times when shareholders should intervene.
Executives are not immune from negligence or opportunism. But acquiring the information,
developing a competing business plan, and lobbying for change requires significant investment.
There is also a great deal of uncertainty. Outsiders can, and frequently are, wrong.67 Further
still, even if the interlopers are right, the gains they engineer are shared with the other equity-

65

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2129. Bebchuk and Hirst also recommend a regulatory safe harbor to allow
proportional allocation of the costs of stewardship within fund families, id. at 2120, facilitating pooling of research
on company underperformance, id. at 2120, mandating more detailed reports on private engagements, id. at 2123-24,
and reconsideration of Section 13(d) as applied to index funds, id. at 2128.
66
Id. at 2122-23.
67
See, e.g., Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Katya Wachtel, Hedge Fund Manager Ackman Says Mistakes Made in JC Penney
Turnaround, REUTERS, Apr. 5, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefunds-ackman-jcpenneyidUSBRE9340MS20130405.
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holders. The only way such intervention makes sense is if the activist has a large enough stake
to justify the cost based on their pro-rata share of the gains.
Bebchuk and Hirst argue that index funds and their sponsors should engage in this sort of
activism.68 But they are ill-positioned to do so. Anyone with sufficient industry-specific
expertise will demand extraordinary and performance-based compensation, both of which are
incompatible with the steady and low base fee charged by index funds. Someone with the
financial wizardry to chart a different, and superior, course for Microsoft is not going to work for
the stewardship department of State Street.
The Big 3 also lack sufficiently large investments. While they do have significant stakes
in portfolio companies, even large stakes are part of a diversified portfolio. Thus, even a
sizeable gain at a single firm will have a limited impact on the fund’s overall return. Expensive,
bespoke, activism is simply an ill fit.
The formula for financially viable interventions is highly compensated managers who
oversee an undiversified portfolio—in other words, activist hedge funds. These funds comb the
public market in search of opportunities to boost share price.69 It is no surprise that this is where
the market has settled. In line with fundamental principles of economic specialization, those
market actors with the most efficient structure are the ones who exploit and capitalize on
opportunities that fit their structure.70
The controversy surrounding activist hedge funds shows how hard it is to boost corporate
performance. They tend to eschew customized interventions in favor of a handful of generic

68

Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 1, at 2095.
See Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 U. MD. L. REV. 652, 679-80 (describing hedge-fund
activism).
70
Professors Gilson and Gordon make a similar argument. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 9, at 896-97.
69
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tactics that quickly affect share prices.71 They seldom try to shift operations to better orient
target firms toward long-term value.72 Rather than undertake the expense and uncertainty that
comes with activism, it makes perfect sense for index funds and their sponsors to wait on the
sidelines and support hedge-fund activists when it is in their interests.73
Bebchuk and Hirst suggest that activist hedge funds are not sufficiently activist because
they are too slow: “The empirical evidence…indicates that companies often underperform for
several years before an activist emerges to push for change. The interests of index fund investors
are therefore not served by ignoring underperformance for long periods in the hope that an
activist hedge fund may choose to address it sometime in the future.”74
This logic is unconvincing. It suggests that index funds can more adeptly and quickly act
on underperformance than hedge funds. Why would this be the case when hedge funds have the
expertise and incentive to intervene as quickly as possible. It also implies that hedge funds are
not short-term oriented enough, and that one or two quarters of underperformance are reason to
pressure management. If anything, there is already too much pressure on managers to deliver
short-term performance, pressure that may hurt long-term index-fund investors.75 Finally,
anecdotal evidence indicates that sponsors suggest potential points of intervention lest anything
fall through the cracks.76
Contrary to Bebchuk’s and Hirst’s argument, the Big 3 do not avoid active intervention
because they share gains with other index-fund sponsors. Nor is it because management fails to
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internalize gains from stewardship that accrue to its own funds. Managers do not invest fund
resources in active intervention because the principals themselves—the shareholders in their
funds—would be ill-served. It would not increase the value of index funds for their managers to
pretend they run hedge funds.
Index Fund Shareholders Benefit From Free-Riding. As noted above, Bebchuk and Hirst
argue that index-fund managers have no incentive to invest in stewardship because doing so
gives them no competitive advantage vis-à-vis other index funds. They frame this as a reason
why competition for additional investors does not cure the agency cost between managers and
index-fund shareholders that they identify.77 But it is much more straightforward to view the
lack of a competitive incentive as an outgrowth of the incentives of the index-fund shareholders
themselves.
The concern of index-fund managers is that investment in stewardship necessitates an
increase in fees to pay for it. This puts them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other index
funds because investors would switch to lower-cost funds, where they could get the benefit from
stewardship without the cost. In other words, if an index fund invests in stewardship, its
shareholders could get a better deal elsewhere. If they could get a better deal elsewhere, it means
that active stewardship is not in the index-fund investors’ best interests. They would prefer that
another index fund (or a hedge-fund activist) incur the costs.78 Bebchuk and Hirst look at the
competitive landscape from the fund manager’s perspective, and thereby frame it as yet another
problem with manager incentives, but the core issue is the free-rider problem at the index-fund
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shareholder level. There is no competitive advantage to stewardship, because shareholders are
better off if another fund bears the stewardship expense.
The Incentives of Index-Fund Managers are Unimportant. Bebchuk’s and Hirst’s
arguments are based on the assumption that the incentives of index-fund managers are the
primary driver of stewardship decisions at the Big-3. This overstates their say. First, and this is
mostly semantics, it is not like there are really index-fund managers in the way the term manager
is usually thought of. The index fund is managed by an algorithm. While there are people who
run the fund, their main job is administrative.79 Second, and more importantly, the stewardship
decisions at the Big 3 are centralized.80 The index fund “managers” do not decide how the index
fund’s shares are voted. Rather, the sponsor generally votes all of its funds’ shares the same
way.81 For example, BlackRock’s shares are usually voted the same way regardless of whether
they are held in active or passively managed funds.82 Voting is at the sponsor level rather than
the fund level.
Finally, the index funds do not dictate how the sponsor votes its shares on behalf of the
fund family. They have a very limited role. According to a recent survey by Morningstar,
“Index portfolio managers [at the Big 3, among others,] have no say in the voting of their
portfolio holdings. Index portfolio management is a highly automated process whereby
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delivering the index performance is the overriding mandate.”83 Thus, even if Bebchuk and Hirst
were right that there were significant agency costs at the index-fund level, that would not
translate to actual voting behavior at the Big 3. The sponsor’s incentive is to vote the shares
based on what is best for the mutual-fund complex as a whole. And just because the Big 3 have
primarily passive holdings, that does not prescribe how they vote. It makes good sense for them
to vote their funds’ shares in a way that favors the managers of funds that make the biggest
profits for the sponsor, and this is their active managers. If anyone is going to have an outsized
role, it will be the managers of successful large active funds.84
The “Backlash” is Against Big-3 Deference. Bebchuk and Hirst argue that the Big 3 are
worried that if they are too hard on corporate executives, those executives will lobby for changes
that would target the Big 3’s “power and activities.”85 This argument is unpersuasive. Fear of
corporate political payback does not seem to have deterred activist hedge funds. And they have
faced no new regulations.86
Further, although the authors leave vague exactly what changes corporations would push
for, the nature of the argument implies that public companies would seek to curtail mutual fund
voting rights to curb their influence. It is quite plausible that mutual funds would not care. As
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discussed further below, mutual funds did not pay attention to proxy voting until regulators
forced their hand. Mutual-fund managers would very likely rather focus on managing portfolios
than governance.
Finally, the bigger concern about backlash is the one that comes from being overly
passive. Indeed, Bebchuk’s and Hirst’s article itself is evidence that a passiveness backlash is
occurring. The authors’ argue that mutual-fund managers need not fear repercussions from
inactivity or deference, because “most investors are unlikely to have sufficient expertise or
resources to evaluate the many stewardship decisions made by index fund managers.”87 But
investors are not their only audience. The backlash to fear from inactivity is not from investors
(who, as I argue above, are fine with it), but from academics, the press, and most importantly,
regulators. If mutual funds want to avert regulation, the last thing they want to do is appear soft
on executive compensation.
The Empirical Evidence is Ambiguous. Bebchuk and Hirst cite much evidence that the
Big 3 do not actively intervene in firm affairs. While passiveness is consistent with an agencycost theory, it is also consistent with the null hypothesis—that there are no agency costs. The
passive behaviors that Bebchuk and Hirst lean on may be exactly what is in the best interests of
mutual-fund shareholders. They may also stem from some other cause.
Moreover, some of the evidence that Bebchuk and Hirst cite do not support their claims.
To back their assertion that the Big 3 are too deferential to management, they point to evidence
that actively managed funds vote against management compensation more frequently than the
Big 3.88 But the authors’ arguments about deference should extend to active managers as well.
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Both actively and passively managed funds should fear political backlash, and sponsors of both
seek 401(k) advising opportunities. Thus, deference cannot explain the discrepancy.
The authors also point to evidence that stronger business ties between funds and portfolio
companies correlates with deference.89 But later they emphasize that the deference from
business ties extends to all companies: “We refer to [the deference] problem as ‘general
management favoritism,’ by contrast to client favoritism, because it involves the manager’s
interest in business ties to induce the manager to be excessively deferential not only toward
managers of companies with which the manager has business ties but toward corporate managers
of public companies in general.”90 The evidence of increased passivity toward business ties
directly contradicts the claim that funds are deferential to all firms.
In addition, the authors point to evidence that, even though many companies have not
adopted governance frameworks in line with the Big 3’s principles, the Big 3 take no action.91
Based on this, the authors argue that the Big 3 cannot simply rely on others to agitate for
change.92 But it may make perfect sense for the funds to wait. The companies that have not
incorporated Big 3 governance principles are smaller firms, which likely represent a tiny fraction
of the sponsors’ funds’ portfolios. Actively agitating for governance changes that would have a
miniscule impact on returns is a waste of investor money. The authors never mention that the
vast majority of S&P 500 firms have adopted governance practices in line with the Big 3’s
principles.93
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Finally, the authors show that the Big 3 do not file Schedule 13Ds, the form required if
they were undertaking active intervention. They imply that the cost associated with the filing
explains this finding.94 But the Big 3 may not be filing these forms because it is not in their
shareholders’ interests to be taking the actions that trigger the filings, not because they wish to
avoid the filings themselves.
Conclusion. Bebchuk’s and Hirst’s argument that agency costs explain stewardship
conduct at the Big 3 is unconvincing. While the interests of fund sponsors and fund investors are
not perfectly aligned, the conflict is not the key driver of fund stewardship. The core problem
with their argument is that they set up an unrealistic level of stewardship as the standard by
which fund sponsors should be measured and then critique them for failure to meet that standard.

C. Competitive-Incentive Model
The FHDS article is not directly opposed to Bebchuk and Hirst. Bebchuk and Hirst take
the position that active intervention in the affairs of portfolio companies is the standard of
stewardship by which mutual funds should be measured and that mutual funds fall below that
standard because of agency costs. FHDS argue that the Big 3 have ample incentive to invest in
stewardship: “Our fundamental insight is that because of the competition faced by mutual fund
sponsors, the sponsors that offer passive funds need to exercise their governance rights in an
informed manner to promote firm value.”95 The sponsors promote firm value primarily by
encouraging and supporting good governance practices at portfolio firms.96
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The key to their argument is the competitive landscape for index funds. They argue that
index funds have the incentive to invest in good governance because they are competing against
actively managed funds. Because index funds cannot exit, the only way for them to distinguish
themselves against actively managed funds is through voice. They must improve the companies
that they own because they cannot leave.97
They also point out that the Big 3’s scale mitigates the collective action problem that
typically deters shareholder involvement in firm affairs. The usual shareholder owns a tiny
percentage of a firm’s stock, so any incremental improvement in value is likely far outweighed
by the cost of investment. But the Big 3 have significant holdings, meaning they capture a large
share of the gains they create.98 Ordinary investors also face an incentive to shirk because their
small holdings give them little power. But the Big 3 own such a large portion of company shares
that they have a pivotal say on the outcome of intervention efforts.99 Finally, the Big 3 also
enjoy economies of scale. When borne by a single investor, cost may make engaged stewardship
infeasible. But the Big 3 can spread the expense across its fund family.100
FHDS do not argue that fund stewardship is perfect. They acknowledge conflicts of
interest and other concerns.101 Ultimately, however, they conclude that the Big 3 have sufficient
incentive to engage with their portfolio companies and have effectively done so.102 That being
the case, they argue that regulatory intervention designed to inspire more participation is
unfounded.103
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D. Critique of the Competitive-Incentive Model
A premise of the FHDS argument is that the level of intervention mutual funds exhibit is
driven and cost-justified by the increase in value that stewardship generates for portfolio
companies. This increase in value improves returns for fund shareholders and, therefore, gives
the sponsor an advantage over competitors. This is a reasonable and appealing narrative that
adds much to our understanding of mutual-fund voting. Building on its insights, below I point
out some difficulties with the theory stemming from the diversity and complexity of the mutualfund marketplace.
Switching Sponsors is Difficult for Many Investors. The authors argue that investments in
good governance at portfolio firms provide a way for index funds to distinguish themselves from
actively managed funds. This competitive advantage is only useful, however, if investors can
readily switch to a competing sponsor’s actively managed fund. Switching to a competitor is not
always easy, though. As noted above, many mutual-fund investors participate through their
employer’s 401(k) plan.104 These plans emphasize funds offered by the sponsor that serves as
the plan administrator.105 While many sponsors do offer funds from competitors in the 401(k)
plans they oversee, these tend to be specialized funds that the sponsor does not offer.106 Thus,
401(k) investors are unlikely to find a direct competitor in their slate of options.
The Competitive Environment for Sponsors is Complex. Sponsors face a range of
competing competitive concerns when deciding how to vote. First consider the competitive
landscape at the index-fund level. Good stewardship does not provide index funds with an
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advantage over all actively managed funds. Rather, it only provides them with an advantage
over those funds that own a smaller proportional share of the targeted portfolio companies. In
fact, if a competing actively managed fund owns more shares, on a proportional basis, than the
sponsor’s index fund, stewardship activities by the index fund might actually lead to a
competitive disadvantage. If the stewardship intervention is successful, the competing fund’s
value will rise by more than the sponsor’s index fund. Thus, increasing the value of their
portfolio holdings does not equate to a general competitive boost for index funds and their
sponsors vis-à-vis the actively managed funds of their competitors.
The competitive landscape becomes even more complex when viewed at the sponsor
level. Perhaps a competing sponsor’s actively managed fund has an investment in a company
that is larger than the sponsor’s index fund, but smaller than the sponsor’s large and profitable
actively managed fund. Because intervention helps the more lucrative actively managed fund, it
may be justified on the sponsor level even though it hurts the index fund’s competitive position
with respect to this particular competitor’s actively managed fund.107
The Big 3 run corporate bond funds as well. Because bondholders prefer corporations
take on less risk, the interests of bondholders often conflict with the interests of shareholders.108
Thus, voting in the interests of its equity mutual-fund shareholders may actually harm the
interests of the investors in the sponsor’s bond funds, decreasing their returns, and making them
less competitive.109 This further complicates the voting calculus for sponsors. Gains to equity
funds are countered, at least to some degree, by losses to bond funds. Whether an increase in
value at its index fund actually confers a net benefit for a sponsor quickly becomes an
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exceedingly complex problem, which depends on the nature of its funds and their holdings and
the makeup of competitor funds.
Moreover, sponsors may not have a full picture of their competitors’ investments. While
mutual funds must report their holdings on a quarterly basis, these are delayed snapshots as of a
certain date, not real-time information.110 This means sponsors may lack the data necessary to
assess the competitive advantage conferred through stewardship. Moreover, assuming dated
fund holdings information is even useful, analyzing it for where to expend stewardship resources
would be costly and time intensive.111
Finally, the complexity of the competitive landscape suggests that if interventions were
truly driven by competitive concerns, fund stewardship activities would be heterogeneous.
Sponsors would focus their efforts only on those portfolio companies where improving
governance would provide a competitive advantage. Instead, the Big 3 apply blanket policies.
This suggests that the search for competitive advantage is not driving their decisions. Along the
same lines, if fund managers really thought there were gains to be made from stewardship, then
they would keep voting for themselves rather that delegate responsibility to a small team of
bureaucrats. The centralization and uniformity of sponsor voting decisions suggests that the
competitive landscape is too ambiguous and complex, both at the fund and sponsor level, to
motivate stewardship.112
Good Governance May Not Increase Firm Value. The idea that investments in
governance at portfolio firms increases the value of those firms may also be faulty. “Good
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governance” is generally synonymous with shifting power from management to shareholders. It
increases firm value to the extent that it reduces the opportunity for management to exploit their
positions or to continue to serve despite poor performance. But it is not cost free. Independent
directors and shareholders are not as well informed as management. Apple’s board famously
fired Steve Jobs.113 Good governance only increases firm value when the benefit of the
increased oversight outweighs the cost of the expertise gap. Good governance is likely good for
some firms and not for others. It depends on the ability and commitment of current management.
Probably because of the ambiguity of the good governance equation, empirical evidence on its
effects are mixed.114
And the low-hanging fruit of good governance was plucked in Sarbanes-Oxley and
related rule changes by the stock exchanges. Public companies are required to have majority
independent boards,115 and completely independent audit,116 compensation,117 and nominating
committees.118 Thus, even if good governance is value enhancing, the biggest features have
already been incorporated. The governance-related proposals that mutual funds are asked to
consider now, even if they improve performance, would only do so on the margin. For example,
113
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proxy access, one of the most heralded changes, has become a staple in public companies
through the shareholder proposal process. But it has been used only once.119
The Benefits of Stewardship May Not Outweigh the Costs. Even if shareholderempowering governance changes at portfolio firms do create value, which confers a competitive
advantage for the sponsor that initiates such changes, any value increase may not be worth the
investment. The Big 3 have increased their stewardship staffs in recent years (though they
remain quite small).120 Their salaries and related costs are only justified if the value they create
is greater.
There are also more abstract costs. Given the competing incentives of fund managers
with respect to different portfolio firms, voting in pursuit of sponsor-level competitive advantage
could cause infighting among managers. This could weigh on morale at the sponsor and even
lead to exit of talent. Finally, there is a relational cost. As noted above, supporting measures
that shift power away from management likely strains relations with the management that
oversees the selection of 401(k) administrators. This cost must be weighed against any value
gained from increased fees from improved performance of portfolio companies and additional
fund investors.
Conclusion. FHDS’s central claim is that competitive incentives drive the Big 3 to
support good governance at firms in their index funds’ portfolios. The difficulty with this claim
is that the Big 3’s market-wide approach to voting, where they support certain governance
structures regardless of the firm involved, does not consistently offer a competitive advantage
given the complex institutional and competitive environment in which they operate. Their
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simplified voting strategy suggests they may be using stewardship to signal to the public and
regulators rather than to best their competitors.

III. ‘Public’ Mutual Funds
A. Publicness Theory and the Big 3
Publicness theory is the idea that private institutions acquire a public nature when they
amass sufficient power and visibility.121 This leads to calls for public-like transparency and
accountability from these institutions and to rules responsive to these calls.122 This theory has
been used to explain the breadth and depth of the regulation of public companies today.123
The textbook policy rationale for the securities laws is to protect investors, but it seems
clear that the laws have transcended that objective. For example, the board independence rules
noted earlier are difficult to defend on investor-protection grounds. So too are rules that require
comprehensive executive compensation disclosures and provide shareholders with a say-on-pay
vote over executive compensation. These rules provide public-like checks and balances on firm
governance, as well as pay transparency akin to what exists for public employees.
Publicness is often used to explain regulations, but an important implication of publicness
theory is that private institutions in the public eye will foresee regulatory efforts and take steps to
ward them off. This implication provides a compelling explanation for mutual-fund stewardship
behavior: the current level of stewardship is an attempt to engage with portfolio companies just
enough to ward off regulation of their voting behavior.
121
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The Big 3 are clearly “public” in terms of their power. Their vast holdings give each an
enormous say in, and collectively control over, many of the biggest companies in the world.124
This is an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a few companies and the
individuals in charge of them.125
Given this power, publicness theory predicts that these institutions will face a backlash.
It has arrived. Many countries have enacted rules governing mutual-fund stewardship behavior
and pushing for more active engagement.126 And mutual-fund voting is clearly on the minds of
U.S. regulators. The SEC regulated adjacent institutions, proxy advisors, in 2020.127 These
companies’ principal business is to advise mutual funds how to vote their shares. Around the
same time, the SEC issued revised guidance to mutual funds about lawful voting behavior.128 In
a keynote address to the Investment Company Institute, the mutual fund trade organization, SEC
Commissioner Roisman expressed concern about conflicts of interest between funds in the same
family and how the centralized voting of fund proxies addresses those conflicts.129 This record
of regulation and commentary shows that the SEC is concerned about corporate governance and
keeping tabs on mutual-fund voting.
Academics, trade groups, and journalists are also increasingly voicing concern. In
comments on the proxy-advisory rulemaking, the American Securities Association the (“ASA”),
a trade association representing regional wealth managers, called on the SEC to regulate mutual-
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fund voting.130 It singled out Blackrock for a surprisingly passionate assault. According to the
ASA, “BlackRock’s market power has eroded investor returns and harmed the least advantaged
within our society.”131 It goes on to argue that Blackrock “wields its vast market power to harm
American investors for its own benefit, in complete violation of its legal fiduciary duty to those
very same investors.”132 The comment was the subject of a laudatory editorial in the Wall Street
Journal.133
Finally, there are provocative studies that suggest the Big 3’s concentrated holdings have
anti-competitive effects.134 As a result, antitrust regulators in the U.S. and Europe are
investigating.135
Publicness theory predicts that such heightened public scrutiny will cause the large
mutual-fund complexes to act in a manner designed to mollify their critics. The way that they
currently engage in stewardship fits this theory well.
Until recently, the mutual-fund industry has shown little interest in stewardship. Their
disregard for voting led first to Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation and then to SEC
rules.136 In the 1980s, the DOL specified that the fiduciary duties of pension-plan advisors
extended to proxy voting.137 In 2003, the SEC went further. It began requiring that sponsors

130

Christopher A. Iacovella, CEO, American Securities Association, Letter to the SEC re: Re: Amendments to
Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2219/s72219-6738826-207680.pdf.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Ed., The BlackRock Backlash, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-BlackRockbacklash-11582849130.
134
See Elhauge, supra note 11, at , 218-54.
135
Ed., supra note 133.
136
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 & n.14 (Feb. 7, 2003) (“Traditionally, mutual funds have been viewed as
largely passive investors, reluctant to challenge corporate management on issues such as corporate governance.”)
137
The statement first came in an interpretive letter. See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y,
U.S. Dept. of Labor, to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), 1988 WL
897696. The obligation is now codified as 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (2020).

30
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3821388

DRAFT
“adopt and implement policies and procedures for voting proxies in the best interest of clients, to
describe the procedures to clients, and to tell clients how they may obtain information about how
the adviser has actually voted their proxies.”138 In addition, the SEC began mandating that
mutual funds publicly report how they vote on each matter on Form N-PX.139
The early response from industry was to outsource research and analysis of voting
decisions to proxy advisory firms.140 The outsourcing never thrilled the SEC, which worried, in
part, that it was a partial abrogation of the fund’s fiduciary responsibilities.141 The scrutiny
around the role of proxy advisors likely explains why the Big 3 are now building larger in-house
compliance teams. More broadly, the reluctance to engage in stewardship until prodded by
regulators suggests that large mutual-fund complexes do not see clear benefits for themselves or
their shareholders in it, and engage in it now to appease regulators, and ward off calls for further
oversight.
Another indication that publicness may be driving voting behavior is that sponsors have
been particularly vocal about their commitment to stewardship. They would have you believe it
is the central thing they do.142 This is likely a show for regulators (and, perhaps, tangentially,
investors who may be concerned about it). If funds were engaging in stewardship in order to
gain a competitive advantage, then they likely would not be so vocal about their efforts. They do
not talk about their stock picks.
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Similarly, the market-wide approach and the tendency to vote for governance structures
now considered “best practices” suggests that funds are using their voting power to signal their
good intentions.143 Voting in this way is low cost and sends the message that there is nothing
worrisome about their activities.
Publicness may also explain the disconnect between what the Big 3 say about social and
environmental issues and their actions. Their words evidence broad support for progressive
stances, but votes for such initiatives are spotty.144 The rhetoric may be designed to generate a
positive public image; their actions designed to keep regulators at bay.
As noted above, mutual funds owe a fiduciary duty to vote shares in the “best interests”
of fund shareholders. Neither the DOL nor the SEC appears particularly receptive to the idea
that progressive environmental and social votes necessarily serve shareholder interests. The
DOL just finalized two sets of rules clarifying its stance. The first forbids consideration of such
issues when selecting investment alternatives for 401(k) participants;145 the second forbids
consideration of such issues when voting.146
The SEC is less strident, but is traditionally lukewarm on these topics. The disclosures it
requires are almost entirely limited to economic issues. Through interpretive guidance, the
agency has encouraged companies to make disclosures related to climate change.147 But the

143

See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Katan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds, European Corporate Governance
Institute - Law Working Paper 560/2020 (fig. 13, 66-68) (showing mutual fund voting behavior), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124039. The Big 3 tend to vote for measures that increase
shareholder power at annual meetings. Id. at 24.
144
Caleb N. Griffin, Environmental and Social Voting at the Big 3, June 16, 2020,
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/06/16/environmental-and-social-voting-at-the-big-three/.
145
See generally Dept. of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan
Investments, 88 Fed. Red. 72846, 72864 (2020).
146
See generally Dept. of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy
Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (2020).
147
Sec. & Exch. Comm., Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6,290 (2010).

32
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3821388

DRAFT
guidance has been largely ignored and the SEC has not taken steps to push companies harder.148
The SEC also recently adopted rules that make it more difficult to make shareholder
proposals,149 something seen as a blow to social activists.150
More generally, the SEC sees its mission primarily in economic terms, and responds
coolly when pushed into the social arena. Former SEC Chairman Piwowar has been vocal. In
comments about the scope of securities-law disclosures, he said “[t]he first and most important
step to improve disclosure effectiveness is to stop the Commission from being used as a pawn of
the union and social justice power brokers. The focus on non-material, special interest disclosure
provisions is a deplorable corruption of our mission.”151 While mutual funds that take
environmental and social issues into account will probably not run into trouble with the SEC, the
safest, most orthodox, route is to focus on matters clearly related to shareholder value.152
Publicness suggests that mutual-fund sponsors engage in stewardship, not because they
think it adds value, but because it appeases regulators. This explains why they engage in it even
though it does not offer clear benefits, why they are so vocal about their engagements, and why
they support policies and proposals that aligns with what regulators would likely support.
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B. Regulatory Implications
Publicness theory is descriptive. It purports to explain the world, not provide an outline
for reform. There is good reason for this. Welfare considerations, such as whether actors are
engaging in misconduct and whether regulatory gaps exist, rather than boundaryless concepts
like transparency and accountability, should guide regulatory analysis.
This is not the place to engage in such work. Nevertheless, the descriptive analysis thus
far counsels against immediate reform. It is difficult to see egregious misconduct. I argued
above that index funds and their sponsors do not engage in more active stewardship because
doing so runs counter to the interests of index-fund shareholders. This implies that shareholders
are mostly satisfied with the status quo.
Moreover, engaging in stewardship to avert publicness-driven regulations makes reform
less necessary. Although the Big 3 might not be acting precisely as regulators prefer (or for the
reasons they prefer), they are meeting them halfway. Without readily identifiable wrongdoing,
the specter of regulation may be sufficient. Finally, it is possible that what begins as regulatory
appeasement morphs into something more substantive. Those newly hired stewardship
employees at Vanguard probably believe in what they do. In this way, values imposed by
regulators steep into firm culture. It seems there is time to wait and see whether a culture of
stewardship emerges without further intervention.

IV. Conclusion
An emergent literature grapples with the enormous voting power of the Big 3. Two
competing theories seek to explain their stewardship behavior. In their agency-cost model,
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Bebchuk and Hirst argue that the Big 3 are poor stewards because they lack sufficient incentive
to police portfolio companies on behalf of their mutual-fund shareholders. FHDS on the other
hand, accept that the Big 3 may not match a Platonic stewardship ideal, but argue that such funds
have sufficient competitive incentive to invest in a largely appropriate amount of oversight.
I argue that neither agency costs nor competitive incentives explain fund stewardship.
Rather, the Big 3 invest the amount they do in stewardship, and vote the way they do, in an
attempt to mollify the public and regulators. This publicness theory of mutual-fund stewardship
is agnostic about reform. If anything, just as the Big 3 intended, their conduct in response to
public pressure blunts potential policy concerns.
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